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I. Introduction: The Context
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women's Protocol or Protocol)' is
* Director and Professor of Law, Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law,
University of Pretoria; LLB, LLD, University of Pretoria; LLM (Cambridge).
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a legally binding multilateral supplement to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights (African Charter),2 adopted in July 2003 by the African
Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government.3 Also referred to as
the "Maputo Protocol," alluding to the place of its adoption, the Protocol
entered into force on November 25, 2005.4 By June 30, 2009, it had been
ratified by 27 of the 53 members of the African Union (AU), 5 all of which
are also States Parties to the African Charter.6
The adoption of the Protocol should be understood against the broader
contemporaneous political, legal, and social background. The substance of
the Protocol did not come to be adopted in isolation from these factors-it
does not exist in a vacuum-and its implementation will take place in a
specific, yet changing, context. Its adoption testifies to the greater visibility
and mobilizing strength of women's organizations in Africa and is the
culmination of a dual drafting process: one initiated by the women's
movement and one steered by the "Inter-African Committee on Harmful
Traditional Practices Affecting Women's and Children's Health. 7
As an instrument adopted by the AU, the Protocol derives its legal
authority principally from the AU Constitutive Act.8 The AU was
1. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, reprinted in Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief
Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in
Africa, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53 (2001) [hereinafter African Women's Protocol].
2. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (27 June 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter
African Charter].
3. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol / %2on/ %20the%2Rig
hts%20oP/o20Women.pdf (listing the States Parties as: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape
Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
6. See African Charter, supra note 2, Art. 1.
7. See, e.g., Rachel Murray, Women's Rights and the Organization of African Unity
and African Union: The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 253, 262 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005)
(describing the experts' meetings and draft protocols before the Protocol was finally adopted
in July 2003).
8. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 entered
into force May 26, 2001 available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/
Constitutive Act en.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act] (on
file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The AU
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established in 2002 at its inaugural meeting in Durban, South Africa,
thereby replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It is upon the
highest AU organ, the Heads of State and Government, that its adoption
rests, and on which sanctions against States Parties for non-implementation
ultimately depends.
9
Although the AU Constitutive Act represents a significant departure
from the 1963 OAU Charter-in particular by including the "promotion of
gender equality" as one of its foundational principlesl'-the omission of a
similar provision from its list of objectives, and the use of the term
Chairperson soon thereafter, elicited the adoption of an amendment to the
Constitutive Act." Increased concern for gender mainstreaming was also
evident in the inaugural meeting of the newly constituted AU.12 Although it
was itself still an exclusively male body, 3 the Assembly decided that the
election of members of the AU Commission in the future should be based
on a 50/50 parity principle. 14 In its subsequent practice, the AU adhered
rigorously to this directive.' 5 However, no similar stipulation is in place in
respect of the two principal positions-those of Chairperson and Vice-
Chairperson of the AU Commission.' 6 These positions have, as yet, only
been held by men. 17 The election of members of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) has come to reflect
Constitutive Act was adopted in Lomd, Togo, on 11 July 2000, and entered into force on 26
May 2001. By mid 2003, all 53 OAU members became members of the AU.
9. See id. Art. 23 (describing the imposition of sanctions on Member States).
10. Id. Art. 4(1).
11. See Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union,
www.africa-union.org (follow the "Documents: Treaties, Conventions & Protocols"
hyperlink; then follow "Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African
Union" hyperlink) which was adopted on 11 July 2003, in Maputo, Mozambique. See also
id. Art. 3(i) (proposing the addition of the objective to "ensure the effective participation of
women in decision-making particularly in the political, economic and socio-economic
areas"); id. Art. 6 (substituting the word "Chairman" for "Chairperson"). By 30 June 2009,
only 25 states have ratified the amending Protocol, which will only enter into force once
two-thirds of members states have become States Parties thereto.
12. See FRANS VIuoEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 204 (2007)
(explaining that the appointment of five female Commissioners was a move towards
reaching gender equality).
13. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first elected female head of state when she took
office as President of Liberia January 16, 2005. Id. at 266.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 266-67 (explaining that despite the improvements, the "the two highest
office bearers during the first term of appointment were still male").
17. Id.
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the parity principle; in fact in 2008/2009, its Chairperson (Justice Sanji
Monageng), Vice-Chairperson (Angela Melo), and Secretary (Dr. Mary
Maboreke) were all female. 18 By contrast, despite a founding document
calling for "adequate gender representation in the nomination process," 19
the AU only managed to elect two female judges out of eleven judges total
to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Human Rights
Court).
20
Soon after the adoption of the Protocol in July 2004, the AU Assembly
also adopted the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU
Solemn Declaration). 21 The Solemn Declaration contains a non-binding
commitment by states to ensure progress towards the promotion and
protection of women's rights in a number of clearly demarcated areas
including HIV and AIDS, conflict prevention and management, gender-
based violence, and development.22 Its targeted nature is arguably eroded
by the inclusion of a very broad paragraph requiring states to ensure "the
active promotion and protection of all human rights for women and girls
including the right to development by raising awareness or by legislation if
necessary. 2 3 In the AU Solemn Declaration, states were also urged to
ratify the African Women's Protocol in order to ensure its entry into force
in 2005.24 Considering that only three states had ratified the Protocol when
this call was made, and that the number increased to fifteen before the end
18. Id. Although the African Commission was initially all-male, the first female
member was elected in 1993 and by 1999 the number grew to four and by 2004 to five. Id.
19. See Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights Art. 12(2), Jan. 25, 2004, available at http://www.africa-union.
org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/africancourt-humanrights.pdf [hereinafter African
Human Rights Court Protocol] (noting that State Parties should give "due consideration" to
gender representation when nominating candidates). If a limited number of female
candidates are nominated, as was the case in the nominating process for judges, the AU
Assembly was constrained in its ability to make gender-sensitive choices. CITE.
20. See, e.g., VIuOEN, supra note 12, at 433-34 (describing the minor role women
played in the nomination and election process).
21. See AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, in COMPENDIUM OF
KEY HuMAN RIGHTs DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN UNION 138 (Christof Heyns & Magnus
Killander eds., 2007) available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/
Past/2006/October/WG/SOLEMNDECLARATIONONGENDER EQUALITYINAF
RICA.doc (last visited Nov. 13 2009) (follow: "Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in
Africa" hyperlink) [hereinafter AU Solemn Declaration] (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
22. Id. Preamble.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Id. at 9.
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of 2005,25 there was clearly an acceleration in the rate of ratification
subsequent to the adoption of the Solemn Declaration. All AU member
states committed themselves to reporting annually at meetings of Heads of
State and Government about progress made towards fulfilling the promises
made under the Solemn Declaration.26  Although this obligation is thus
placed on all AU members states irrespective of the treaties they have
ratified "to date only seven states [Algeria, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia,
Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia] have submitted their reports. ' 27 The
AU Chairperson also has to submit an annual report on progress in realizing
28the objectives set out in the Declaration.
In 2009, the AU went further along the path of mainstreaming gender
into its activities by adopting a Gender Policy.29 The AU Gender Policy
contains eight commitments relating to the creation of a political
environment conducive to adherence with the 50/50 gender parity principle,
the mobilization of resources to implement the Gender Policy, gender
mainstreaming, and the effective participation of women in peacekeeping. 30
The Gender Policy makes specific reference to the Protocol and encourages
both its further ratification and its early domestication by all AU member
states.3'
Institutionally, the AU Commission established a Women and Gender
Development Directorate within the Office of the Chairperson of the AU
Commission.32 The mandate of the Directorate is to build the capacity of
"AU organs, RECs and members states to understand gender, develop skills
for achieving gender mainstreaming targets and practices in all policy and
25. See supra note 5 (listing the names of countries that have ratified of adopted the
Protocol and the date they did so).
26. AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 13.
27. Implementation of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa,
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/October/WG/doc.htm (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
28. Id.
29. See African Union Gender Policy, Rev 2, 10 Feb. 2009, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/GE/African%20Union%20gender/20Policy.doc
(explaining that the Statutes place the internal gender workings with the Chairperson of the
Commission who has the goal and responsibility of mainstreaming gender) [hereinafter AU
Gender Policy].
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 14.
32. See, e.g., RACHEL MutRRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS iN AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO THE
AFRICAN UNION, 155-56 (2004) (discussing the structures related to women within the AU).
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programme processes and actions by 2010." 3  The AU's developmental
blueprint, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and
the related African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), also reiterate crucial
features of the Protocol, such as women's role in decision-making and
conflict resolution and access to reproductive services.34
At the sub-regional level, most of the sub-regional economic
communities have also established Gender Units. The most prominent
development has been in Southern Africa where the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) in August 2008 adopted the SADC
Protocol on Gender and Development (SADC Gender Protocol).35 The
SADC Gender Protocol, which has been signed by 12 of the 15 SADC
member states, 36 will enter into force after it is ratified by two-thirds of
these states.37 So far, no SADC member state has ratified the SADC
Gender Protocol. This Protocol grew out of a binding instrument bearing a
closely related declaration (the SADC Declaration on Gender and
Development of 1997) and a supplement thereto (the Addendum on the
Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children of
1998).3"
II. Supplementing the Substantive Basis
According to its Preamble, the Protocol was adopted to address the
concern that "despite the ratification of the African Charter on Human and
33. AU Gender Policy, supra note 29, at 4.
34. See Country Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 1.3.1
(Objective 7), http://www.uneca.org/aprm/Documents/Questionnaire.pdf. (explaining the
need for women to have a "meaningful status in the country" where they can adequately
participate in society such that it may be demonstrated by producible evidence).
35. SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, http://www.cladem.org/english/
news/Protocol%20on%20Gender/o20August%202008%20-%2EnglishOOO 1 (4).pdf
[hereinafter SADC Gender Protocol].
36. South African Development Community, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/
recs/sadc.htm (listing the signed onto the SADC Gender Protocol: Botswana, Mauritius and
Malawi and explaining that the Gender Protocol has not been ratified by any of the other
twelve SADC member states (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe)) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
37. SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 40-41.
38. See Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights
Comes into Force, 50 J. AFR. L. 72, 74 (2006) (explaining the drafting process of the African
Women's Protocol).
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Peoples' Rights and other international human rights instruments by the
majority of State Parties... women in Africa still continue to be victims of
discrimination and harmful practices. '39 Therefore, the Protocol should not
be viewed primarily as correcting normative deficiencies in international
human rights law dealing with women's rights, but rather as a response to
the lack of implementation of these norms.4 °
At the time of the drafting and adoption of the Women's Protocol, the
two main instruments of particular relevance to the rights of women in
Africa (the African Charter and the UN Convention on the Elimination of
all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 41), enjoyed
universal and near-universal ratification in Africa, respectively.42  The
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children's
Charter), which deals with the rights of children under the age of 18
including the girl-child, enjoyed less state support.43 Subsequent to the
adoption of the African Women's Protocol, two further instruments of
limited relevance to women in Africa have been adopted. The AU Solemn
Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa" was adopted, but it is a non-
binding declaration and is limited in its legal effect even though it is
extensive in its reach to all AU members. The other instrument, the SADC
Gender Protocol,45 is potentially binding on AU members, but only on those
within the SADC region that have ratified it.
The substantive symmetry (in terms of overlap and peculiarity)
between the African Women's Protocol, on the one hand, and each of these
five instruments, on the other, will now be reviewed. The aim is not to
39. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble.
40. See Banda, supra note 38, at 77 ("To break the deadlock, the drafters agreed to
make the right subject to national law, which solution constitutes a usurpation of
international law principles.").
41. UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
[hereinafter CEDAW].
42. African Charter, supra note 2; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1980) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
43. See VIJuoEN, supra note 12, at 265 (explaining that the nature of some Charter
provisions are more relevant to children but the Commission has not received any
allegations of violations of such children' rights and "the initial reporting guidelines do not
devote much attention to children's rights"). By June 2003, only 31 states has become party
to the Children's Charter; by 30 June 2009, that number has increased to 45.
44. AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21.
45. SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35.
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provide a comprehensive picture, but merely to shed light on the most
prominent overlapping and distinguishing features of these instruments.
A. Women's Protocol: African Charter
From the 1990s, women's rights started to receive more attention in
the African Commission. Institutionally, this focus culminated in the
establishment of the position of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Women in Africa, in 1998.46 At that stage, a process of elaborating an
African instrument on women's rights was already under way.
Spearheaded by an increasingly vocal and visible African women's rights
movement, debate about the need for an additional instrument to extend the
scope and content of women's rights in the African Charter increased, and
the notion of a substantive supplement to the Charter gathered momentum.
Not all participants in the discussion supported the adoption of an
additional instrument. Under the Charter, it was argued, everyone is a
rights-bearer, not every man.47 Article 2 of the Charter reinforces that the
rights in the Charter (including the right to dignity, bodily security, and
education, to name but a few of them that may resonate in women's lives),
are to be enjoyed without any discrimination on the basis of sex, among
other grounds.48 In Article 18(3), the Charter specifically mentions the duty
of States Parties to "ensure the elimination of every discrimination against
women."49 Against this background, it was argued that the real problem lay
in the lack of the utilization of the available system by women or on their
behalf, and that the potential of the Charter should be unlocked by
campaigning for the adoption of resolutions ("General Comments") on
rights of relevance to women.50 This argument found support in the
generally progressive and expansive interpretive approach of the
46. See VIIuOEN, supra note 12, at 224 ("The appointment of one of the members of
the Commission as Special Rapporteur on Children in Africa will go a long way towards
ensuring that the right set out in the African Children's Charter are not neglected to the
Commission's work.").
47. African Charter, supra note 2, Preamble.
48. Id. Art. 2.
49. Id. Art. 18(3).
50. See, e.g., CORINNE A. PACKER, USING HuMAN RIGHTS TO CHANGE TRADITION:
TRADrITONAL PRACTICES HARMFUL TO WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN SuB-SAHARA
AFRICA 127-29 (2002) ("Additional interpretive measures to the African Charter would
improve the protection of African women's rights .... While the Commission has never
issued a General Comment, it is not precluded.").
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Commission, which suggested that such an approach would be likely to
succeed if fully explored. 51  Little has also been done to explore the
possibility of the individual communications procedure in respect of
women. Before adopting a new treaty, the argument is that the normative
and institutional potential of the existing system should be used to its full
potential.
However, the argument for a new substantive shield for women in
Africa won the day. Article 18(3) was criticized for its conflation of the
rights of women with those of children, the aged, and the disabled, and for
being situated in an article that primarily deals with the family.52  In
addition, the majority were convinced that an African instrument would
provide more specificity, serve as a clear yardstick for assessing
government action, act as lobbying tool, and denote African ownership. 3
Eventually adopted in 2003, the Protocol "brings into the open the
Charter's shrouded premise that women are included in its protective
scope. 54 As a supplement to the African Charter, the Protocol attempts to
underline the rights for women enumerated in the Charter and to elaborate
upon their relevance. In doing so, however, the Protocol does not enter into
a systematic engagement with each of the Charter rights.5 5  As a
consequence, it has been argued that the choice of provisions of the
Protocol leaves an eclectic impression.56 Without a clear rationale, some
51. See, e.g., Media Rights Agenda and Others v. Nigeria, 2000 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.
REP. 200, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centrepublications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2000.html
(last visited Nov. 13 2009) (demonstrating the African Commission's progressive approach
to the interpretation of the "claw-back" provisions in the Charter) (on file with Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also Social and Economic Rights
Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v. Nigeria, 2001 AFR. HuM. Rrs. L. REP. 60, 71-72,
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centrepublications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2001.html (last visited
Nov. 13 2009) (noting the African Commission's reading in of the right to shelter and food
into the African Charter) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
52. See, e.g., Winston Langley, The Rights of Women, the African Charter, and the
Economic Development of Africa, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 215, 216-17 (1987) (explaining
how Article 18 merely incorporates the rights of women and children by reference).
53. But see Murray, supra note 7 (explaining that other than acting as a "promotional
tool" it was unclear how the Protocol was different from past documents and standards or
what else it intended to add to those documents).
54. Viljoen, supra note 12, at 271.
55. See Murray, supra note 7, at 265 (explaining the inconsistency of which provisions
were incorporated or rejected in the Protocol).
56. See id. at 264 ("[T]he Protocol wavers between being an interpretation of the
ACHPR for women on the one hand, and a collection (not a comprehensive one) of some
existing international standards on the other. It ends up falling short of both these
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rights received much less attention. For example, a women's right to
property has been subsumed into other rights.57
By providing for rights of both a civil-political and socio-economic
nature, the Protocol confirms the Charter's premise that rights are
indivisible and interdependent. In fact, the Protocol, basing itself implicitly
on the Commission's jurisprudence, goes beyond the scope of the rights
provided for under the African Charter by including the right to food
security" and adequate housing.59 The Protocol also extends the scope of
the right to health by requiring states to take "appropriate measures" to
make health services accessible particularly to rural women. 60 Although it
explicitly includes the need to strengthen "pre-natal, delivery and post-natal
health ... services, 61 under this obligation, it does not go as far as to
stipulate the desired outcome of a reduction in maternal and infant
mortality.
The Protocol is inconsistent with its predecessor, the African Charter,
because it omits two of the overriding features of the Charter: (1) that
rights-bearers are not only individuals but also "peoples" and (2) individual
duties are named alongside individual rights.62
Clearly, women are included in the group "peoples" as the term is used
in the Charter.63 Perhaps conscious of the complexities that may be
introduced by earmarking women as a collective, the Protocol refrains from
doing so, although it restates some of the peoples' rights in the Charter as
they apply to women. The right to peace is a prime example: In the
Protocol, the Charter right of "peoples" to an unspecified "national and
international peace" 64 is converted into the right of "women" to "the
objectives.").
57. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 7(d), 19(c) (providing
examples of such property rights which were incorporated).
58. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 15 ("State Parties shall ensure
that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food.").
59. See id. Art. 16 ("Women shall have the right to equal access to housing and to
acceptable living conditions in a healthy environment.").
60. Id. Art. 14(2)(a).
61. Id. Art. 14(2)(b).
62. See, e.g., Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Reclaiming (Wo)manity: The Merits and
Demerits of the African Protocol on Women's Rights, 53 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 63,
94-95 (2006) (explaining how the Charter fails to articulate a consistent African approach).
63. See African Charter, supra note 2 (using the word "peoples" rather than a more
specifically defined term).
64. Id. Art. 23.
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promotion and maintenance of peace., 65 As women are already recognized
as a collective in many provisions of the Protocol,66 it is not clear what
advantages would have been achieved by earmarking them as a "people."
In my view, such an approach would just have exacerbated the already-
existing confusion about the term "peoples" in the Charter.
Individual duties are not explicitly featured in the Protocol. In my
view, this omission is in line with the insight that the Charter experience
showed that these provisions (which are mostly moral imperatives) are
largely redundant in the legal text of the Charter. Some mention of the
reciprocity of rights and duties could have been made in the Preamble, but
it could also be argued that such invocation would be a mere restatement of
the Charter.
B. Women's Protocol: CEDA W
Although the African Women's Protocol has been drafted as an
addition to the African Charter and not as a response to CEDAW, the
Protocol invites comparison with CEDAW, being the main UN treaty on
women's rights. Compared to CEDAW, the Protocol speaks in a clearer
voice about issues of particular concern to African women, locates
CEDAW in African reality, and returns into its fold some casualties of
quests for global consensus, resulting from the adoption of CEDAW. More
specifically, the Protocol expands the scope of protected rights beyond
those provided for under CEDAW and it deals with rights already covered
in CEDAW with greater specificity. Importantly, it emphasizes the private
sphere as an important domain in which rights are to be realized and it
underlines the need for "positive action.,
67
The Protocol expands the protective scope of women's rights by
addressing numerous issues of particular concern to African women that
were not included in CEDAW. The Women's Protocol is the first treaty to
provide for the right to circumscribed "medical abortion." 68 It is also the
65. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 10(1).
66. See id. Arts. 10, 16-19 (recognizing rights and duties specifically for "individuals,
children, and parents" creating an "obligation to treat another with respect and without
discrimination").
67. See id. Art. 2 (listing the actions for combating "all forms of discrimination against
women").
68. See id. Art 14(2)(c) (requiring states to authorize "abortion in cases of sexual
assault, rape, incest, and where a continued pregnancy" threatens the health of the mother or
the life of the fetus).
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first binding treaty to provide for the right of a woman to be protected
against HIV infection and to know the H1V status of her sexual partner.
69
The drafting history of the Protocol testifies to the contentious nature of
polygamy. Although initial drafts called for its abolition, the Protocol
places an obligation on States Parties to encourage monogamy. 7° A
necessary implication of targeting violence against women and "unwanted
or forced sex" in the private sphere is that the Protocol requires domestic
violence legislation and the criminalization of rape in marriage. States are
under an obligation to enact and enforce laws prohibiting domestic
violence.72 Compared to CEDAW, the Protocol provides in greater detail
for the "protection of women in armed conflict, 73 and reiterates the need to
accord women refugees the protection under international law.74 Under the
Protocol, the girl-child may, in particular, not be recruited or "take a direct
part in hostilities."7 5 State parties to the Protocol must set the "minimum
age of marriage" at 18, and all marriages must "be recorded in writing."
76
The Protocol provides specificity where vagueness prevailed, for
example when it clarifies that "positive African cultural values 7 7 are those
"based on the principles of equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice,
solidarity and democracy., 78 It also spells out the scope of socio-economic
rights in greater detail than CEDAW, which limited some socio-economic
rights to "rural women. 7 9 Under the Protocol, women have the "right to
69. See id. Art. 14(1)(d) (stating that states have to ensure that women are "protected
against sexually-transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS"); id. at art 14(l)(e) (requiring
states to ensure that women are informed of the HIV status of their partners "in accordance
with internationally recognized standards").
70. See id. Art. 6(c) (noting that the rights of women in polygamous marital
relationships must be promoted and protected). In previous drafts, polygamy was totally
outlawed. But in the final Protocol a watered-down compromise was adopted, allowing
polygamy to persist with a guarantee of women's protection, combined with an
encouragement of monogamy as the preferred form of marriage.
71. Id. Art. 4(2)(a).
72. See id. Art. 4(2) (calling on states to prohibit violence against women "in private
or public").
73. Id. Art. 11.
74. Id. Art. 11(3).
75. Id. Art. 11(4).
76. Id. at Arts. 6(b), 6(d).
77. African Charter, supra note 2, Art. 29(7).
78. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble.
79. See CEDAW, supra note 42, Art. 14 (stating the economic problems rural women
face and the measures taken to eliminate that form of discrimination).
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food security,"8 ° and to "adequate housing."8' In addition, the state parties
must reduce military spending in favor of social spending, particularly on
women.
82
The precarious position of groups of women that have been rendered
particularly vulnerable due to the loss of a spouse,8 3 old age, 84 disability,85
and poverty86 also receives the Protocol's attention. The Women's Protocol
addresses multiple oppressions that some women face on the grounds of
gender as well as disability, poverty, and "the loss of a spouse overlap with
old age.,
87
Adopting a distinctly transformative stance, the Protocol emphasizes
"corrective" and "specific positive" (or "affirmative") action. While
CEDAW contains a generic provision allowing for "temporary special
measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and
women,"88 the Protocol reiterates the need for positive measures by locating
them in different contexts. Pre-empting arguments based on formal
equality, the Protocol requires states to adopt measures that may favor
women above men, such as electoral quotas for women, in order to ensure
substantive ("in fact") equality.89 Positive action is also specifically
required with regard to discrimination in law, 90 illiteracy, and education. 91
It may be argued that the differences between the Protocol and
CEDAW are more apparent than real because in general comments,
resolutions, concluding observations, and findings, the CEDAW Committee
has expanded the scope of the relevant treaties. However, even if these
clarifications have considerable persuasive weight, they do not constitute
binding obligations. By making those "clarifications" unequivocally
binding-and by supplementing them--the Women's Protocol takes an
undeniable normative step forward.
80. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 15.
81. Id. Art. 16.
82. Id. Art. 10(3).
83. See id. Art. 20 (describing the rights of women who are widows).
84. See id. Arts. 21-22 (describing the rights women have to an inheritance and the
"special protection of elderly women").
85. See id. Art. 23 (describing the "special protection of women with disabilities").
86. See id. Art. 24 (describing the "special protection of women in distress").
87. Id.
88. CEDAW, supra note 42.
89. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 9(1).
90. Id. Art. 2(1)(d).
91. Id. Art. 12(2).
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C. Women's Protocol: African Children's Charter
The obvious overlap between the Protocol and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children's Charter)92 arises
from the scope of the two instruments: The Protocol covers all "persons of
female gender, including girls, 93 without setting any age limitation and the
African Children's Charter deals with "every human being below the age of
18 years. 94 From the point of view of the "girl-child," both treaties are
therefore potentially relevant.
In so far as they both explicitly deal with the girl-child, the two
instruments are largely similar. The African Children's Charter stipulates
eighteen as the minimum age of marriage, 95 a threshold that was
subsequently introduced into the Protocol.96 The same applies to the further
requirement that all marriages must be recorded in writing.97 The Protocol
also echoes the obligation of states party to the African Children's Charter
to take "all necessary measures to ensure that no child [ I] take[s] a direct
part in hostilities, ' 98 adding the phrase: "Especially girls under 18 years of
age.
99
When it was adopted, the African Children's Charter presented a
significant advance on existing international human rights law, both in
comparison to the African Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child. By restating these provisions, the African Women's Protocol
essentially solidifies and reinforces this progress.
D. Women's Protocol: Solemn Declaration
In its eight substantive paragraphs directed at the domestic arena of
states, the Solemn Declaration addresses nine specific areas of domestic
law and practice. Each of these areas resonates with a particular provision,
92. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Organization of African
Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999 [hereinafter African
Children's Charter].
93. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 1 (k).
94. African Children's Charter, supra note 92, Art. 2.
95. See id. Art. 21(2) ("Child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be
prohibited....").
96. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 6(b).
97. Id. Art. 6(d); African Children's Charter, supra note 92, Art. 21(2).
98. African Children's Charter, supra note 92, Art. 22(2).
99. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 11 (4).
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or provisions, in the Protocol, addressing: (1) the impact of HIV and AIDS
on women;'00 (2) the inclusion of women in peace processes and post-
conflict reconstruction;' 0' (3) the prohibition of recruitment of child
soldiers; 10 2 (4) the prohibition of the abuse of women as wives and sex
slaves; 10 3 (5) public awareness and sensitization about gender-based
violence and trafficking in women; 1 4 (6) observance of the parity principle
in elections at the national and local level; 0 5 (7) the promotion and
protection of women's rights, including, in particular, the right to
development; 10 6 (8) "the implementation of legislation to guarantee
100. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 1 ("Accelerate the
implementation of gender specific economic, social, and legal measures aimed at combating
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and effectively implement both Abuja and Maputo Declarations on
Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Disease."), with African
Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 14(l)(d), 14(1)(e) ("[T]he right to self-protection and
to be protected against sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS."). Article 14
of the African Women's Protocol, is much more focused and only deals with the right to
"self-protection" and the right to be informed of the status of a sexual partner. However, it
could be assumed that these aspects would be subsumed in the more general scope of the
Solemn Declaration.
101. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 2 ("Ensure the full and
effective participation and representation of women in peace process including the
prevention, resolution, management of conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction in
Africa. .. ."), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 10 (showing closer
congruence with the Solemn Declaration).
102. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 3 ("Launch ... campaign
for systematic prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers .... "), with African Women's
Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 11(4) ("States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure
that no child, especially girls under 18 years of age, take a direct part in hostilities and that
no child is recruited as a soldier.").
103. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at In 2, 3
("Launch... campaign for systematic prohibition of... abuse of girl children as wives and
sex slaves. . . ."), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 3(3), 3(4), 4(2)(g)
(prohibiting "exploitation or degradation of women").
104. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 4 ("Initiate, launch and
engage... sustained public campaigns against gender based violence as well as the problem
of trafficking in women and girls ... ."), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts.
2(2), 4(2)(f) ("[E]stablish mechanisms and accessible services for effective information,
rehabilitation and reparation for victims of violence against women.").
105. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 5 ("Expand and Promote the
gender parity principle that we have adopted regarding the Commission of the African
Union .... "), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 9(l)(b) (ensuring that
"women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes").
106. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 6 ("Ensure the active
promotion and protection of all human rights for women and girls including the right to
development by raising awareness or by legislation where necessary."), with African
Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 19 ("Women shall have the right to fully enjoy their
right to sustainable development.").
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women's land, property, inheritance," and housing rights;'07 and (9) the
need to ensure the right to education for children, and literacy for women.
10 8
E. Women's Protocol: SADC Gender Protocol
A comparison between the Women's Protocol and the SADC Gender
Protocol reveals many similarities, but also some significant differences.
The SADC Gender Protocol deals with specific areas of domestic law
and practice, many of which resonate with a particular provision in the
Women's Protocol. For example, both provide for the adoption of
constitutional rights'0 9 and domestic legislation. 10 In some instances, the
SADC Gender Protocol merely restates the provisions of the Women's
Protocol, but often in a more elegant formulation. The provision on the
rights of widows is a case in point."'
However, there are also numerous differences, ranging from subtle to
substantial. While the SADC Gender Protocol includes a separate provision
on aftirmative action, the Women's Protocol deals with "affirmative action"
and "positive action" with respect to particular rights. 112 Both instruments
cover the essential aspects of equality in accessing justice, and emphasize
107. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 7 ("Actively promote the
implementation of legislation to guarantee women's land, property and inheritance rights
including their rights to housing."), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 6,
16 (dealing mainly with property rights in the context of marriage).
108. Compare AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 8 ("Take specific measures
to ensure the education of girls and literacy of women. . .."), with African Women's
Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 12 (discussing the right to education and training for women).
109. Compare SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 4 ("States Parties shall
endeavour, by 2015, to enshrine gender equality and equity in their Constitutions and ensure
that these rights are not compromised by any provisions, laws or practices."), with African
Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 2(1)(a), 2(1)(b) (including principal of equality in
national constitutions and calling for creation of legislation to curb discrimination against
women).
110. Compare SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 6 (requiring equality in
domestic legislation), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 2 (requiring
elimination of discrimination against women in legislation).
111. See SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 10 (combining articles 20 and 21
of the African Women's Protocol); see also African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts.
20, 21 (providing rights for widows and rights to inheritance).
112. Compare SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 5 ("States Parties shall put
in place affirmative action measures with particular reference to women in order to eliminate
all barriers which prevent them from participating meaningfully in all spheres of life. .. "),
with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 9(1) (promoting women's participation
and representation in governance).
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the need for legal aid for women. 13 In addition, the Protocol stipulates that
law enforcement organs must be equipped to deal with gender issues,1 14 and
requires that women must be represented equally on these organs, 1 5 while
the SADC Gender Protocol emphasizes that the principles of equal access
and representation for women should also apply in customary and
traditional courts.' 1 6 Although the essence of marriage and family rights is
similar in the two instruments, a striking difference is that the SADC
instrument does not enter into the debate about monogamy versus
polygamy.1 7
The SADC Gender Protocol departs most poignantly from existing
instruments, including the Women's Protocol, in its setting of specified
targets. In fact, one of the objectives of the SADC Gender Protocol is to set
"realistic, measurable targets, time frames and indicators" to achieve gender
equality 18  With respect to provisions that lend themselves to being
reviewed by a particular date, such as those requiring the amendment or
enactment of laws, the SADC Gender Protocol posits "by 2015" as the
desired or determined time frame.19 These targets are sometimes very
specific, for example, by requiring that by 2015 "at least fifty percent of
decision-making positions in the public and private sectors are held by
women." 120  Another important example is the obligation placed on state
113. Compare SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 7 (ensuring equality in
accessing justice), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 8 ("Women and men
are equal before the law and shall have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.").
114. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 8(d) (ensuring "that law
enforcement organs at all levels are equipped to effectively interpret and enforce gender
equality rights").
115. Id. Art. 8(e).
116. See SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Arts. 7(a), 7(f) (requiring female
participation in courts and other judicial proceedings).
117. Compare id. Art. 8 (ensuring" women and men enjoy equal rights in marriage and
are regarded as equal partners in marriage"), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1,
Art. 6 (discussing that men and women "are regarded as equal partners in marriage" and
encouraging monogamy).
118. SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 3(d).
119. See id. Art. 4(1) ("States Parties shall endeavour, by 2015, to enshrine gender
equality and equity in their Constitutions. . . ."). "Desired time frame" is based on the
wording of the SADC Gender Protocol, which stipulates that states "shall endeavour... "
while "determined" refers to those instances where the Protocol places a much more direct
obligation in the form of phrases such as "shall adopt" or "shall review." See id. Art. 6
("States Parties shall review, amend and or repeal all laws that discriminate on the ground of
sex or gender by 2015.").
120. Id. Art. 12(1).
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parties to reduce the "maternal mortality ratio by 75% by 2015.'1121 By
identifying precise and tangible indicators, the SADC instrument has raised
the bar of expectations, and has increased the accountability potential of the
state reporting process.
Another difference relates to budgeting. Rather than stipulating a
budgetary hierarchy, as the Women's Protocol did in its article 10(3), the
SADC Gender Protocol requires all states to ensure "gender sensitive and
responsive budgeting" at all levels of budgeting. 122
While the SADC Gender Protocol may have dealt more
comprehensively with the HIV pandemic besetting the sub-region, its
linking of gender-based violence with HIV is most appropriate, as is the
obligation it places on states to provide "ready access to post exposure
prophylaxis at all health facilities., 23 This is the first international treaty to
encompass this obligation. While the African Women's Protocol focuses
on two aspects (self-protection and the right to knowledge of a partner's
HIV status), 24 the SADC instrument covers the issue more holistically, for
example, by obliging states to "develop gender sensitive" prevention
strategies. 21
Although the SADC Gender Protocol was inspired by the Women's
Protocol, the sub-regional treaty surpasses its regional predecessor in its
specificity. A comparison between the Women's Protocol and the SADC
Gender Protocol illustrates that greater normative coherence among a small
group of relatively homogeneous states can give rise to a more concrete
formulation of rights and more targeted obligations on states.
121. Id. Art. 26(a). By contrast, the African Women's Protocol does not mention
maternal mortality by the name.
122. Compare SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 15(2) ("States Parties shall
ensure gender sensitive and responsive budgeting at the micro and macro levels, including
tracking, monitoring and evaluation), with African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art.
10(3) ("States Parties shall take the necessary measures to reduce military expenditure
significantly in favour of spending on social development in general, and the promotion of
women in particular."). But see African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 26(2)
(imposing an overarching obligation on states to allocate budgetary resources towards the
implementation of the rights in the African Women's Protocol).
123. SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 20(2).
124. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts. 14(1)(d), 14(1)(e) (discussing
the right "to be protected against sexually transmitted infections").
125. See SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 27(1) ("States Parties shall take
every step necessary to adopt and implement gender sensitive policies and programmes, and
enact legislation, that will address prevention, treatment, care and support in accordance
with, but not limited to, the Maseru Declaration on HIV and AIDS.").
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTOCOL
F. Conclusion
In sum, even if they lack systemic coherence, the five instruments
discussed here create a web of potential bases for legal protection and of
intersecting advocacy routes for women in Africa. The emerging image of
overlapping and connecting, yet often divergent, layers of protection giving
rise to multiple possibilities underscores the portrayal of international law
as a "superstore" or "warehouse of treaties, customs, international
institutions and norms," rather than a coherent or closed system.
126
Although the lack of coherence may be troubling to some, and may cloud
states' understanding of their obligations, collectively these norms
constitute a significant advance in women's empowerment, and avail them
of a wide range of possible normative routes on which to base future
strategies.
Still, it is overly simplistic to think that all the rights conflate into a
single "system." The treaties and other instruments remain distinct, with
specific state parties, specified procedures, and particular mechanisms.
While there may be substantial normative overlap, there will also be
important distinctions between these instruments. In reconciling these
instruments, their interrelationship should be guided by the principle that
the most "favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights of women"
prevails in cases of conflicting provisions.
27
Some gaps still remain. For example, the impact of HIV and AIDS on
women has not been dealt with in sufficient detail. Although HIV is
mentioned for the first time in the Women's Protocol, it is only in the
SADC Gender Protocol that it is addressed in any meaningful way. Even
there, the impact of HIV and AIDS on women's lives has not been fully
accounted for. Silence still surrounds the position of marginalized women,
such as lesbian and bisexual women, sex workers, and women belonging to
indigenous minorities.
126. See Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and Postmodern
Possibilities of International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 508 (2000) ("From a
'postmodern perspective,' international law is best understood as a superstore, a warehouse
of treaties, customs, international institutions and norms, as well as national laws intended to
implement or to avoid them." (citations omitted)).
127. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 31 ("None of the provisions of
the present Protocol shall affect more favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights
of women contained in the national legislation of States Parties or in any other regional,
continental or international conventions, treaties or agreements applicable in these States
Parties.").
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III. Improving Implementation
The overriding rationale for the adoption of the African Women's
Protocol was the concern that, despite the ratification of international
human rights instruments, women in Africa continue to be victims of
discrimination and harmful practices. 28  The question about the "added
value" of the Protocol, therefore, ultimately has to find its answer in
improvements in the actual enjoyment of the relevant rights by women.
The effect of the Protocol on women's lives depends, at the national level,
on its effective domestication and available domestic remedies, and, at the
regional level, on effective implementation by the African Commission. In
this section, the extent to which the Protocol enhances and expands on
existing domestic and regional implementation mechanisms is discussed
before the threat to implementation posed by the possibility of reservations
is considered.
A. Domestication and Domestic Legal Redress and Interpretation
Even if the Protocol is an international treaty, its effect has to be felt at
the national level if it is to meet the basic rationale for its adoption, which is
the full realization of the rights provided for under the Protocol.
As a legal instrument, this entails the availability of effective domestic
legal and other remedies to rectify violations. Consciously addressing this
aspect, the Protocol places an obligation on state parties to provide for
"appropriate remedies" in their domestic legal systems, and to "ensure that
[claims for] such remedies are [adjudicated] by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities."'129 Inadequate access to the legal
system has been one of the reasons why, before the adoption of the
Protocol, women have not been able to translate the legal norms contained
in treaties into effective guarantees. By repeatedly highlighting the need
that states make legal aid available to women, 130 the Protocol deals
explicitly with this aspect.
128. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble (noting that "despite the
ratification of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other international
human rights instruments by the majority of States Parties, ... women in Africa still
continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices").
129. Id. Art. 25.
130. See id. Arts. 8(a), 8(b) (providing legal aid to women).
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B. Domestic Non-Legal Measures
While the recognition of the importance of legal redress and legal aid
are important first steps towards the realization of women's rights, the
Protocol embraces a much more multifaceted and multi-disciplinary
approach towards the domestic implementation of its provisions.
The crucial role of education and awareness-raising runs like a golden
thread through the Protocol. States are, for example, required to embark on
campaigns to educate and sensitize "women and men," by way of public
education, to break down stereotyping and culturally engrained patterns of
superiority and inferiority 13  and to eliminate "harmful practices
through [ ] formal and informal education and outreach programmes."'
' 32
Adopting a detailed and practical approach, the Protocol, for example, calls
on states to "eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and the
media." 133
In one of its most far-reaching provisions, the Protocol highlights that
states have to provide budgetary resources to ensure the effective
implementation of the rights.134 In article 10(3), the Protocol goes even
further by introducing-for the first time in such an international human
rights instrument-a hierarchy of budgetary priorities: States are required
to "take the necessary measures to reduce [the amount allocated towards]
military [spending] significantly in favour of spending on social
development in general, and the promotion of women in particular."' 35 As
it is included in a legal text, this provision should, in my view, be
understood as establishing a basis for review by the African Commission,
or the African Human Rights Court, of budgetary allocations by state
parties. The provision does not invite the Charter-based institutions to
substitute their views about specific allocations, but allows them to review
allocations already made, particularly with reference to a period of two or
more years.
131. Id. Art. 2(2).
132. Id. Art. 5(a).
133. Id. Art. 12(1)(b).
134. See id. Art. 26(2) ("States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures and in
particular shall provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective
implementation of the rights herein recognised.").
135. Id. Art. 10(3).
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C. Interpretive Guidance
Even if it does not lead to an overhaul of legislation or constitutional
amendment, the Protocol provisions create a new frame through which the
relevant national law should be viewed, and if necessary, reinterpreted, and
adjusted. This may be a more indirect or sweeping influence of the
Protocol on national law than its direct application, but its role should not
be discounted. The use of the Protocol as an interpretive guide depends on
the knowledge and initiative of lawyers, who need to bring these
possibilities to the attention of judicial tribunals, and on the keen
understanding of judicial officers, who should grasp the opportunities to
develop the law in line with the Protocol.
The case of Ts'epe v. The Independent Electoral Commission and
Others136 presents a good example of how international human rights law
was used effectively to bolster a legal argument before a national court and
to clarify an ambiguity under domestic law. The ambiguity arose from an
affirmative action provision in the Election Act of Lesotho, which reserves
one-third of the seats in every council election for women, leaving the
remaining seats open to be contested by women and men equally.1 37 A
male voter argued that this electoral quota violated his right to equality, and
contended that the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act should be
declared unconstitutional. 38  The dispute amounted to a legal contest
between a formal and substantial interpretation of equality. Finding support
in Lesotho's international obligations, in particular CEDAW, and in the
SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, the Lesotho Court of
Appeal found that the Constitution mandated a substantive approach to
equality and upheld the constitutionality of the electoral quota on that
basis. 139 It should be noted that the African Women's Protocol was not
136. Ts'epe v. The Independent Electoral Commission and Others, 2005 AFR. HUM.
RTS. L. REP. 136, 136 (Lesotho Ct. App. June 2005), available at http://www.chr.
up.ac.za/centrepublications/ahrlr_2005.html (last visited Nov. 13 2009) (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice) (holding "affirmative action
to ensure higher percentage of women in local government permissible under the
Constitution").
137. See id. at 137 (discussing election law reserving one third of the Council seats for
women).
138. See id. (discussing appellant's request that election law be held unconstitutional).
139. See id. at 149 (finding election law rationally connected to objective to advance
greater electoral representation of women).
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relied upon or invoked in the case, presumably because it was not yet'in
force at that time.
140
By contrast, the Protocol is specifically mentioned in Katakwe v.
Hakasenke and Others.'41  However, this case illustrates what often
happens: The Protocol is referred to in passing, without clarity about the
role or the weight that is sought to be attached to it, leaving one with the
impression that the "citing" of the Protocol could just as well have been
omitted. 42  This case, a claim for damages arising from the rape of a
student by a teacher in his private home, was decided on the basis that the
teacher committed a tort by failing in his duty of care to the student.143 In
his judgment, the presiding officer mentions that counsel for the plaintiff
"cited" Article 4 of the Protocol, which requires that all forms of
exploitation "shall be prohibited.'" 44  However, this provision is not
integrated either in the restated argument of counsel, or the judgment.1
45
In Katakwe, the judge further quotes article 4(2) of the Protocol, which
places an obligation on state parties to "enact laws to prohibit all forms of
violence against women."146  The formulation of this provision clearly
requires domestic action on the part of the state for its effective application
or implementation, making it an example of a non-self-executing treaty
provision. 47  Similarly, article 14(2)(c) of the Protocol contains very
specific grounds on which "medical" abortion should be allowed. 48 On the
one hand, it could be argued that the provision is sufficiently precise to
140. Lesotho ratified the Protocol on 26 November 2004. See List of Countries Which
Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN UNION,
May 26, 2007, http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/ratificationwomen%20protocol.pdf.
141. Katakwe v. Hakasenke and Others, Case No. 2006/HP/0327 J1, J8, Civil
Jurisdiction, High Court of Zambia, June 30, 2008 (Judge Musando) [hereinafter Katakwe
case] (holding that a child under sixteen years of age cannot consent to a sexual relationship
with an adult).
142. See id. (citing Article 4 of the African Women's Protocol).
143. See id. at J7-J1 1 (discussing the duty of care that teachers owe students and
finding the teacher violated that duty).
144. See id. at J8 (citing article 4 of the African Women's Protocol).
145. See id. at J12 (failing to mention the African Women's Protocol in the Judgment).
146. See id. at J1, J8 (citing article 4(2) of the African Women's Protocol).
147. See VIJOEN, supra note 12, at 534-35 (discussing the self-executing nature of
treaty provisions).
148. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 14(2)(c) (authorizing "medical
abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy
endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the
foetus").
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serve, by way of example, as a defense against the prosecution of a medical
care worker who performed an abortion on a women who had been raped.
By not allowing an abortion under such circumstances, the state would
arguably be in breach of its obligation to take all appropriate measures to
protect the reproductive rights of women "by authorising medical
abortion[s] in cases of... rape. 149 On the other hand, the provision could
be viewed as non-self-executing, in that it places an obligation on states to
take appropriate measures, foremost among which is the adoption of
legislation.
Other provisions of the Protocol that may be viewed as more clearly
self-executing, in that the specificity of their formulation gives rise to
immediately enforceable obligations, could serve as sources of remedial
action for litigants and not only as interpretive guidance. An example of a
self-executing provision is the requirement that states need to ensure that
girls (women under the age of eighteen years) do not take part directly in
hostilities. 5° Arguably, if no legislation to this effect is adopted in a
particular state, and the involvement of girl-children in hostilities is proven,
the state's obligation under the Protocol is precise enough to give rise-at
the very least-to a finding that the state failed in its duty to protect this
right. It is not inconceivable that a state party's domestic court would find
a violation of the relevant provision and order the state to adopt and apply
legislation, investigate a case, or pay compensation. Another example of a
self-executing provision is the right of a widow "to continue to live in the
matrimonial home." 151 Arguably, an attempt to force a widow out of the
matrimonial home-in the absence of any domestic law on the issue--can
be resisted by invoking the right in the Protocol, which should be made
operational by way ofjudicial enforcement of the relevant provision.
149. Id.
150. See id. Art. 11(4) ("States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure that
no child, especially girls under 18 years of age, take a direct part in hostilities and that no
child is recruited as a soldier.").
151. Id. Art. 21(1).
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D. State Reporting
According to Article 62 of the African Charter, state parties to the
Charter are under an obligation to submit reports to the African
Commission, every two years, setting out the measures they have taken to
give effect to the rights under the Charter. 5 2 Similarly, state parties to the
Protocol are required to allow inspection of their observance of the African
Women's Protocol by submitting periodic state reports for the African
Commission's examination. 153 As they have accepted the Protocol as a
substantive supplement to the African Charter, it should be assumed that
states party to the Protocol must report on the measures taken to realize the
Protocol rights simultaneously with their periodic reports under Article 62
of the Charter. This obligation is spelt out explicitly in the Protocol,
mirroring the wording in the "mother text."' 54 This provision was probably
included for the avoidance of any doubt, and to serve as a reminder to states
of their obligation to submit periodic reports. As no additional time frame
for reporting is provided in the Protocol, it should further be assumed that
the report on the Protocol provisions should be incorporated in the
following round of reporting under the Charter for the state concerned, and
then every two years thereafter. It is suggested that states that are party to
both the African Charter and the Protocol submit one report, but in two
parts: Part A dealing with the African Charter and Part B dealing with the
provisions of the Protocol.
Despite the inclusion of this obligation, however explicitly, the main
problems of non-reporting and late submission of reports under African
human rights treaties are likely to occur also with respect to reports under
the Protocol. t 55 By failing to consistently adopt and publicize concluding
observations after examining state reports, the Commission itself has also
been responsible for undermining the effectiveness of the state reporting
152. See African Charter, supra note 2, Art. 62 ("Each state party shall undertake to
submit every two years, ... a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to
giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter.").
153. See African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 26(1) (discussing that reporting
legislative measures ensures implementation of the Protocol at the national level).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray, The State Reporting Mechanism of
the African Charter, in THE AFucAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE
SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 1986-2006 49, 52-57 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2d ed.
2008) (discussing "[t]he failure of many States to comply with their obligations, and the
subsequent-arguably, lack of-reaction by the Commission" with respect to submitting
reports in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter).
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procedure. The mere extension of the scope of the rights to be reported
upon is therefore no guarantee of their improved implementation.
If anything, reporting under the Protocol poses additional challenges to
the Commission. For one thing, there is a need to develop guidelines for
reporting to assist states with the required format and content of their
reports under the Protocol. At the time of this writing, no such guidelines
exist. During the examination of state reports under the Charter, the
practice of the Commission has been to leave questions about women's
rights to the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women. Similarly, with
respect to state parties to the Protocol, the Special Rapporteur usually poses
a series of questions about women's rights without specific reference to the
Protocol. As for state practice with respect to reporting, the reports of state
parties to the Protocol almost universally omit any specific discussion on
the measures taken to give effect to the Protocol. Women's rights are
mostly dealt with as part of the report under Article 18(3) of the Charter.
In the development of these guidelines, the Commission could take
into account the existing reporting obligations of states under CEDAW and
the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa. As CEDAW has
been ratified by 51 African UN member states, 156 including all state parties
to the Protocol, and because all AU members are obliged to report under
the Solemn Declaration, 157 the extent of potential overlap in obligations is
evident. A reporting system could be devised in a way that addresses the
recurrent apprehension of states about being overburdened by multiple
reporting obligations. Unnecessary duplication should be avoided. One
option would be for a state to attach to its Charter/Protocol report any
recently submitted CEDAW or Solemn Declaration report. The guidelines
for reporting under the Protocol should then stipulate the additional aspects,
unique to the Protocol, on which state parties have to report.
Such a solution was opted for in the guidelines for reporting under the
African Children's Charter, in an effort to create synergy between states'
reporting obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
and under its African pendant, the African Children's Charter.' 58 While the
156. See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the
Advancement of Women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice) (listing the States Parties to the CEDAW).
157. See AU Solemn Declaration, supra note 21, at 12 ("Commit ourselves to report
annually on progress made in terms of gender mainstreaming and to support and champion
all issues raised in this Declaration, both at the national and regional levels, and regularly
provide each other with updates on progress made during our Ordinary Sessions.").
158. See Guidelines for Initial Reports of State Parties to the African Charter on the
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significant extent of overlap between the UN and African treaties relating to
children made such an approach workable, the much more substantial
difference between CEDAW and the Protocol would arguably pose greater
challenges to the introduction of a similar synergy between the reports
under these two instruments.
Should such a strategy be followed, a time limit should also be fixed
within which the CEDAW or Solemn Declaration report should have been
submitted (for example, within the last three years). Alternatively, the state
could be guided to update the relevant information. It may further be
required that the report should have been of a certain quality, and to provide
guidelines as to this aspect.
Because of its relatively limited scope, its targeted provisions and the
frequency of reporting (which is required on an annual basis), the AU
Solemn Declaration may lend itself better to such an attempt to harmonize
reporting. As intimated above, there is an extensive overlap between the
issues to be reported upon under the Solemn Declaration and the Protocol.
At the same time, the limited scope of the Solemn Declaration leaves much
room for additional information to be provided under the many provisions
of the Protocol that the Declaration does not cover. Reporting guidelines
under the Protocol could therefore require states to submit their most recent
report under the Solemn Declaration, and should further stipulate which
Protocol provisions still need to be reported on as part of the state report
under the Charter/Protocol.
At the sub-regional level, once the SADC Gender Protocol has entered
into force, states party thereto also have to submit two-yearly reports on the
"progress achieved in the implementation" of the rights in the Protocol. 59
This "progress report" should be directed to the SADC Executive Secretary,
who serves as a conduit to transfer these reports to the main political organs
of SADC, the Council, and the Summit, for their "consideration."'' 61 While
the SADC Gender Protocol promises more focused reporting by
highlighting the requirement that states "collect and analyze baseline data"
against which "targets will be monitored,"'161 the politicized (rather than
Rights and Welfare of the African Child, 3 AFR. HuM. RTs. L. J. 347, 353 (2003) ("A state
party that has already submitted its report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is
required to re-submit such report to the African Committee together with a supplementary
report devoted to the provisions of the Children's Charter not duplicated in the CRC.").
159. SADC Gender Protocol, supra note 35, Art. 35(4).
160. Id. Art. 35(5) (stating that the "SADC shall submit progress reports to Council and
Summit for consideration").
161. Id. Art. 35(3).
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quasi-judicial) nature of the monitoring is likely to detract from the
effectiveness of the process. In any event, this possibility is rendered
nugatory due to the fact that the SADC Gender Protocol only relates to one
of the continent's five regions, and because no state reports are likely to be
received in the near future since no state has yet to ratify that instrument.
Whatever approach is taken, the guidelines should try to find the
balance between brevity and comprehensiveness, something that the
existing guidelines under the African Charter fail to achieve.
E. Individual Complaints
In treating individual complaints, the African Charter differs from
other international instruments in that it renders the acceptance of the right
of individual petition an automatic consequence of ratification or
accession.1 62 In other words, there is no prerequisite that states party to the
Charter have to accept an optional mechanism that allows for individual
communications. By contrast, the CEDAW does not allow for a complaints
mechanism at all, which prompted the subsequent adoption of the Optional
Protocol to the CEDAW, allowing individuals to submit complaints against
state parties to the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol was entered
into force on 22 December 2000. As of 30 June 2009, 18 African states
have accepted the right of individual petition. 1
63
Despite the fact that women's rights issues could form the basis of
complaints to the African Commission, such complaints have only been
162. See African Charter, supra note 2, Art. 47 (giving States Parties to the Charter a
mechanism to report violations of the Charter by other States Parties to the OAU).
163. The following states have accepted the right to individual petition: Angola,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Tanzania.
Interestingly, six of these states have by that date not become States Parties to the African
Women's Rights Protocol, namely: Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritius, Niger and
Tunisia. See Irungu Houghton, Reviewing the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa,
NEWS FROM AFRICA, May 24, 2006, http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/
articles/art_10688.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
The acceptance of individual complaints in respect of women under the UN system and not
under the African human rights system reveals a preference for the global regime on the part
for these states. The reasons for this preference remain speculative, but may relate to the
lack of awareness of states about the Protocol, or may be a vote of no-confidence in the
African mechanism. In any event, this state of affairs cast a shadow over the notion of
"African ownership" of the African Women's Protocol.
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invoked in a few instances, and then only tangentially to other more
prominent allegations. 164
The lack of communications to the African Commission alleging
violations of women's rights is one of the reasons why the Protocol was
adopted. 65  For this reason, and because the Protocol supplements the
normative scope of Charter rights but retains the African Commission as its
implementing arm, it should be assumed that individual communications
arising from the Protocol may be submitted to the Commission. The
Protocol should, in this respect, be contrasted with the African Children's
Charter, which established a separate monitoring body, the Committee of
Experts on the Rights of the African Child. Evidently faced with a choice
between establishing a new supervisory mechanism and extending the
substantive basis of the Commission, the drafters of the Protocol opted for
the latter. 166 This choice reflects a more realistic approach and may have
been informed by factors such as the danger of further institutional
proliferation and the difficulties besetting the Committee of Experts in its
first few years of operation.
Unfortunately, the African Women's Protocol is not a model of clarity
on this issue. In contrast to the explicit provision requiring states to submit
reports on the measures adopted to give effect to Protocol rights, the
Protocol does not likewise extend the scope of the Commission's protective
mandate. In fact, the Protocol provides that the African Human Rights
Court "shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising from the
application or implementation" of the Protocol,1 67 and adds that the
Commission shall fulfill this function pending the Court's establishment.
168
It is submitted that the reference to the African Human Rights Court
should be understood as an attempt to clarify that the Court indeed has
jurisdiction over complaints submitted to it by the Commission arising from
the Protocol on that basis, or submitted directly to the Court by individuals
in states that have made the declaration under Article 34(6) of the Court
164. See Murray, supra note 7, at 259 (stating that of the cases brought before the
CEDAW, none specifically related to women's rights and only a few addressed women's
rights as a secondary issue).
165. See id. at 264 (stating that the Protocol was effected to offer an enforcement
mechanism for women's rights outlined in the Charter).
166. See id. (finding that the Protocol "wavered between being an interpretation of the
[Charter] for women on the one hand, and a collection of some existing international
standards on the other").
167. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 27.
168. Id. Art. 32.
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Protocol. The need to make this competence explicit came about because
the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the Court, which was
adopted before the Women's Protocol, understandably does not include the
Protocol as part of the Court's substantive jurisdiction.
It is inconceivable that the Commission would not have competence to
consider communications alleging violations of the African Women's
Protocol. The core rationale for the adoption of the Protocol is the need to
ensure that women's rights are protected. 69 One of the means to do so is
by way of individual communications (complaints). As a substantive rather
than a procedural supplement to the African Charter, 70 the Protocol is
superimposed on the existing protective framework of the Commission.
The logic of the complementary relationship between the African Charter
and the African Women's Protocol requires that the Protocol be read as
enlarging the scope of claims that may be submitted to the Commission in
order to improve the situation of women. In the absence of any explicit
provision excluding the competence of the Commission to do so, the
Protocol should be understood to mandate the Commission to examine
communications alleging violations of the rights under the Protocol.
It is therefore submitted that individuals in states party to the Protocol
are entitled to submit communications to the African Commission.
Unfortunately, by 30 June 2009, communications under the Protocol had
been finalized by the Commission. It is not clear whether any such "cases"
are pending. One of the reasons for the dearth of submissions is the
avoidable lack of clarity in the Protocol, which has just added to the
numerous other factors already inhibiting the submission of complaints to
the African Commission by and on behalf of women.
F. Investigations
Adopting reasoning along lines similar to those advanced above, the
Commission's mandate to use "any appropriate method of investigation," ''
is equally applicable with respect to the rights in the African Women's
169. See id. Preamble (stating that the Protocol was determined to "ensure that the
rights of women are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to fully enjoy
all their human rights").
170. See Murray, supra note 7, at 264-65 (discussing the many instances where the
Protocol breaks from the Charter in order to incorporate provisions from other international
documents).
171. African Charter, supra note 2, Art. 46.
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Protocol. The Commission therefore has the competence to undertake fact-
finding (on-site) investigations on the basis of complaints received in
respect of a state party to the Protocol. By 30 June 2009, no such
investigation had been undertaken. However, it should be mentioned that
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women has undertaken numerous




Although neither the African Charter nor the Protocol explicitly
provides for the possibility of reservations, international law allows state
parties to these and other similarly worded treaties to do SO.' 73 While this
omission may be a factor explaining the difference in African state practice
between the CEDAW and the African Charter and the Protocol, another
factor may be that states regard the comparatively lackadaisical attitude of
fellow states towards the African system, and weak implementation and
follow-up by the African Commission, as indications that reservations are
not required. It should also be mentioned that some of the most ardent
opponents of aspects of the Protocol, and thus more likely to enter
reservations upon ratification, have not yet become state parties. 74 Some
of the non-ratifying states-especially those with a majority Muslim
population-may indeed have second thoughts about ratifying the
Women's Protocol in the light of their experience with reservations under
CEDAW.
172. For example, the Rapporteur has collaborated with other partners to conduct a
study on poverty amongst women in Francophone West and Central Africa and engaged in a
promotional mission on women's rights in Chad, C6te d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. See Activity
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2000-2001, AHG/229
(XXXVII), 24 (detailing the recent activities of the Commissioner of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Women).
173. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (allowing a state or international organization
to formulate a reservation to a treaty).
174. For example, Tunisia, Sudan, and other North African Islamic states that have not
ratified the Protocol objected to certain provisions of the Protocol because they are
fundamentally at odds with Shaia law. See Banda, supra note 38, at 76-77 (discussing
how the ability for a mother to assign her nationality to her child and the divorce provisions
under the Protocol were inconsistent with Sharia law). See also Houghton, supra note 163
(listing states that have not ratified the Protocol).
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In any event, the reality is that entering reservations to the Protocol has
not manifested itself as a significant impediment to potential realization of
the rights in the Protocol. Despite the fact that a number of states raised
concerns during the drafting stages of the Protocol, 175 very few converted
their misgivings into reservations at the time of ratification.
76
Namibia, South Africa, and The Gambia entered reservations upon
ratification of the Women's Protocol. 177 Namibia and South Africa entered
a reservation to Article 6(d), which requires marriages to be recorded in
writing and registered in order for them to be valid. Namibia's reservation
applies "until legislation regarding the recording and registration of
customary marriages is enacted." The specificity and limited temporal
application of this reservation most likely render it compatible with the
object and purpose of the Protocol. South Africa's reservation is not
temporary in nature. 78 The text of the reservation argues that according to
the law governing customary marriages in South Africa, 179 failure to
register customary marriages does not render them invalid, and that "it is
considered to be a protection for women married under customary law."'1
80
It may be argued, however, that the failure to register customary marriage
significantly increases the likelihood that women younger than 18 would
get married. In that sense, South Africa's reservation may be viewed as
175. See Banda, supra note 38, at 76-77 (stating that Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and
Tunisia objected to the use of the word "equal" in describing certain women's rights in
comparison with rights of men).
176. Only The Gambia, Mauritius, and South Africa entered reservations to the
Protocol. ACHPR.org, Protocol to the African Charter, http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/
womenprot..htrn (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) [hereinafter ACHPR] (on file with Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
177. See African Human Rights Documents, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hrdocs/themes/
theme39.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice) (providing separate ratification instruments by Gambia and
Namibia as reservations to the Protocol). See also Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi, The Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa: South Africa 's Reservations and Interpretative Declarations, 12 LAw, DEMOCRACY
AND DEVELOPMENT 41, (2008) (discussing the meaning and legal implications of the
reservations and interpretative declarations to the Protocol).
178. South Africa entered further reservations but they aimed to extend rather than
restrict protection and are not discussed here.
179. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, § 4(9), GG19539 of 2 December 1998
(stating that "[flailure to register a customary marriage does not now affect the validity of
that marriage").
180. South Africa's Instrument of Ratification to the Protocol Art. 6(d), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hrdocs/documents/SAinstrumentsOfRatification.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
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striking at a core provision of the Protocol.' The Gambian Parliament
entered a blanket reservation to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 14.182 Resulting from a
sensitization campaign by civil society, in collaboration with the
parliamentary committee on women's rights, and profiting from the
prospect of the upcoming AU summit meeting to be held in June 2006, the
Gambian Parliament decided to withdraw the reservations in March
2006.83
In respect to numerous African state parties, the normative force of
CEDAW has been eroded significantly due to far-reaching reservations
entered by these states. All states that have become state parties to the
Protocol are also parties to CEDAW. 184 Three of them (Lesotho, Libya,
and Mauritania) reserved part of CEDAW, but did not enter similar
reservations when ratifying the Protocol.
8 5
On 25 August 2004, the Government of Lesotho informed the
Secretary-General that it had decided to modify its reservation, which now
reads as follows: "The Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho declares
that it does not consider itself bound by article 2 to the extent that it
conflicts with Lesotho's constitutional stipulations relative to succession to
the throne of the Kingdom of Lesotho and law relating to succession to
chieftainship.' 86 When it became a party to the Protocol, on 26 October
181. See also CEDAW, supra note 42, at 36 (stating that the Committee "considers
that the minimum age for marriage should be 18 years for both man and woman"); id. at 39
(stating that "[sitates parties should also require the registration of all marriages whether
contracted civilly or according to custom or religious law").
182. Article 5 of the Women's Protocol deals with the elimination of harmful cultural
practices such as female genital mutilation. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 5.
Article 6 of the Protocol, dealing with marriage, includes the requirement of full consent to
marriage, the stipulation that 18 years is the minimum age of marriage, and the right of
married women to acquire and manage their own property. Id. Art. 6. Article 7 requires
states to adopt laws to ensure equality between men and women in separation, divorce and
annulment of marriage. Id. Art. 7. Under Article 14 of the Protocol, states are required to
ensure various aspects of women's health and reproductive health, including the right to
family planning education and allowing for "authoriz[ed] medical abortion" in cases of rape
and incest. Id. Art. 14.
183. Interview with Ms. Sainabou Jaye, Programme Officer, Ctr. For Democracy &
Human Rights Studies, in Banjul, Gam. (Nov. 15, 2006).
184. See UN.org, State Parties to the CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/states.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice) (listing States Parties to CEDAW and whether the parties
entered or revoked a reservation to CEDAW); ACHPR, supra note 176 (listing States Parties
that have ratified the Protocol).
185. See ACHPR, supra note 176 (listing The Gambia, Mauritius, and South Africa as
the only states to enter reservations to the Protocol).
186. Modification of the Ratification of the Government of Lesotho (Aug. 25, 2005),
16 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 11 (2009)
2004, Lesotho did not repeat this reservation, even though the Protocol is
quite explicit on this issue.' 87 In the generally framed Article 2, states are
called upon to commit themselves to "modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education," to
eliminate practices that are "based on the idea of inferiority" of women or
on the "stereotyped roles for women and men." 88 Given the centrality of
Article 2 in the framework of the Protocol, and the overriding importance
of the King and chiefs in Lesotho, where traditional structures still have
much currency, it is contended that a reservation similar to the one under
CEDAW would have been incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Protocol. 89 One may interpret the omission of a reservation as amounting
to a change from the previous position that Lesotho held when it was
ratifying CEDAW. This is the impression given particularly because both
instruments deal with women's rights and specifically address the
principles of equality and political participation.' 90
http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/ChaptlfV_8/withdrawals/Lesotho.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009). The original reservation, entered upon ratification, read as follows:
The Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho declares that it does not consider
itself bound by article 2 to the extent that it conflicts with Lesotho's
constitutional stipulations relative to succession to the throne of the Kingdom of
Lesotho and law relating to succession to chieftainship. The ratification by the
Government of Lesotho is subject to the understanding that none of its
obligations under the Convention, especially in article 2(e), shall be treated as
extending to the affairs of religious denominations. Furthermore, the
Government of Lesotho declares it shall not take any legislative measures under
the Convention where those measures would be incompatible with the
Constitution of Lesotho.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Advancement of
Women, Annex II, Declaration made by the Government of Lesotho, U.N. Doc. A/51/277
(Aug. 7, 1996).
187. Article 9 of the Protocol requires State Parties to ensure "increased and effective
representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making." African
Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Art. 9(2). As the Protocol contains no exemption for
traditional or non-democratic structures, it appears that the exclusion of women from
succession to the throne or from the position of chief falls foul of the Protocol.
188. Id. Art. 2(2).
189. Bonny Ibhawoh provides a contrary view-that exclusive male claims to
chieftaincy do not constitute gender discrimination but rather are cultural, much like the
male priesthood-in Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy
of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HuM. RTs. Q. 856, (2000).
190. See CEDAW, supra note 42, Arts. 2, 7 (stating under article 2 a desire to "embody
the principle of equality of men and women in their national constitutions," and to "grant
women equal rights with men" in regards to determining their nationality and the nationality
of their children under article 9); African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, at Arts. 2, 9
(stating that parties should embody of the principle of equality between men and women in
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Libya entered reservations related to Islamic Shari 'ah law in respect to
Articles 2 and 16(c) and (d) of CEDAW.' 9' Despite provisions in the
Protocol with an effect similar to those to which it made reservations to
under CEDAW, 192 Libya did not make any reservations to the Protocol.
Upon ratification of CEDAW, Mauritania entered a very broad and
encompassing reservation, stating that it only accepts those parts of
CEDAW that are "not contrary to Islamic Shariah and are in accordance
with our Constitution."'193 However, when Mauritania ratified the Protocol,
it did not restate this reservation.
With minor exceptions, state parties to the Protocol have not eroded
their ratification of the Protocol by entering reservations. In one particular
instance, that of The Gambia, pressure has been mustered successfully
against reservations, resulting in their withdrawal. 194 In respect of the two
remaining reservations, the Commission should, during the examination of
state reports as part of the unlikely consideration of a relevant
communication, or in the form of a resolution, express itself on the
compatibility of these reservations with the object and purpose of the
Protocol.
IV. Conclusion
The adoption and entry into force by state parties and the
domestication of the African Women's Protocol is incomplete. It has not
yet been accepted continent-wide, and some state parties still fall short of
giving effect to its provisions. While the goal is complete regional
acceptance of the Protocol, this should not be attained at the cost of
allowing numerous reservations.
their constitutions in article 2, and that State Parties should promote "the equal participation
of women in the political life of their countries" in Article 9).
191. See Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice) (providing the reservations by Libya regarding articles 2 and 16 of the CEDAW)
[hereinafter CEDAW Reservations]; CEDAW, supra note 42, at Arts. 2, 16.
192. Articles 6 and 7 of the African Women's Protocol state that men and women shall
be equal during marriage and its dissolution. African Women's Protocol, supra note 1, Arts.
6, 7. This could mean equal in terms of rights and responsibilities towards their children.
193. CEDAW Reservations, supra note 191.
194. See ACHPR, supra note 176 (noting that The Gambia had withdrawn its
reservations by May 2006).
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Co-exiting with CEDAW, the AU Solemn Declaration, the African
Children's Charter, and the SADC Gender Protocol, the African Women's
Protocol is part of a rapidly changing landscape in which the rights of
women are given much more serious consideration than in the recent past.
As a regional instrument, the African Women's Protocol speaks to the
concerns of women in Africa with greater precision and less ambiguity than
CEDAW, but in a less precise and targeted way than the SADC Gender
Protocol. From the vantage point of women in Africa, these instruments are
mutually reinforcing and provide a menu from which the most relevant and
appropriate tactical and strategic choices can be made.
The potential effect of the Protocol depends largely on the knowledge
and awareness of its content and the possibilities of its use in advocacy,
legal reform, and litigation. Proper domestication and internalization
should ultimately lead to greater correspondence between international
human rights standards and the lived realities of women. Thus far, this
potential has remained largely untapped. The African Commission should
take immediate steps to set reporting under the Protocol in motion. Civil
society should mobilize around the provisions of the Protocol,19 and
communications alleging violations of its provisions should be submitted to
the Commission.
As important as it may be as a legal tool, the role of the Protocol
remains limited. It is women's fundamental subordination embedded in
socio-economic and cultural structures that underlies the denial of their
rights, not the dearth of legal guarantees reaffirming their rights.
Obviously, the Protocol will not change this situation overnight, but it may
contribute to its gradual reversal.
195. For example, the mobilization of NGOs in Cameroon following the negative
reaction to the ratification by Cameroon of the Protocol in May 2009 (in particular, gay
rights organization Alternatives-Cameroon and l'Association pour la Defense de
I'Homosexualite). See Jerina Messie, Church "Manipulates Public Opinion" on
Homosexuality, BEHIND THE MASK, July 16, 2009, http:mask.org.za (discussing how gay
rights organizations rallied against the Catholic Church for "deliberately causing confusion"
about the Protocol). The archdiocese of Douala organized a protest march against the
inclusion of the "right to abortion" and raised the spectre of homosexuals" rights being
protected under the Protocol. Id.
